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Diversification and Bank Stability 
 
Shuo Liang, Fernando Moreira and Joosung Lee 




This paper tests a theory in the literature regarding the role of diversification in bank systemic 
risk and investigates whether this effect is different for bank standalone risk. We innovatively 
construct a country-level diversification measure to capture the risk distribution among banks. 
Based on a large dataset consisting of 1,346 international publicly listed banks from 49 
countries from 1998 to 2018, our results confirm existing theoretical conclusions that higher 
diversification leads to more systemic risk and less bank standalone risk. 
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1 Introduction  
Wagner (2010) proposes a model arguing that diversification at financial institutions makes 
systemic crises more likely since a higher diversification makes institutions exposed to 
common risks through holding similar portfolios, although diversification reduces each 
institution's standalone risk. This theory has received considerable attention because it provides 
a novel insight into bank systemic risk by identifying a mechanical reason for the adverse effect 
of diversification even under "normal circumstances." Nevertheless, this theory has not been 
empirically tested yet in the context of banking due to the challenge in constructing a 
diversification measure that can reflect the mechanism in which diversification influences risk. 
By innovatively building up a country-level diversification measure, we test the impact of 
diversification on both systemic and standalone risk1, based on a dataset consisting of 1,346 
international publicly listed banks from 49 countries from 1998 to 2018. Our country-level 
diversification indicator utilizes revenue data of individual banks in a country, and implicitly 
reflects the risk distribution among banks through capturing the distribution of banks’ revenues. 
This characteristic makes our empirical analysis more appropriate to test the mechanical 
reasons of Wagner (2010) than other studies that employ traditionally used bank-level 
diversification indicators (Mercieca et al., 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Elsas et al., 2010). 
Our results confirm that an increase in diversification in a country leads to more systemic risk 
while reducing bank idiosyncratic risk. 
 
2 Data and Methodology 
We retrieve accounting information from Worldscope to construct our diversification indicator 
and bank-specific variables, and obtain stock price information from CRSP, Datastream and 
Compustat Global to compute market-based indicators. 
 
1 We define “bank risk” as the opposite of “bank stability”. 
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To investigate the effect of diversification on bank stability, we employ the fixed effects model 
to control for unobserved time-invariant bank- and country-specific fixed effects and year fixed 
effects. The model is specified as follows: 
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ×  𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿1 × 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿2 ×
𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + νj + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  
where subscripts 𝑖, 𝑗 and 𝑡 denote bank 𝑖 in country 𝑗 in year 𝑡. bank riski,j,t represents bank 
systemic (∆CoVaR) or idiosyncratic risk (Z-Score) measures.  diversification
j,𝑡−1
 denotes the 
country-level revenue diversification measure (CRD).2  We use time lagged values of the 
diversification indicator to mitigate the issue of reverse causality from bank risk to 
diversification. Bank-specific control variables include bank-level diversification (RD), bank 
size, capitalization, non-performing loans, loan growth ratio, deposit ratio and loan ratio. RD 
is included to control for the possibility of biased information on the degree of diversification 
in a country since CRD does not reflect the distribution of interest and non-interest incomes 
within each bank.3 Macroeconomic variables include GDP growth rate, GDP per capita and 
inflation rate. 𝜇𝑖, νj and 𝜏𝑡 capture bank, country and year fixed effects, respectively. 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is 
the error term. 
 
3 Results and Discussions 
Table 1 shows our results concerning the relationship between country-level diversification 
and bank stability in the dimensions of idiosyncratic and systemic risk. We employ both fixed 
effects estimations and two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions in order to confirm that our 
 
2 Detailed calculations of CRD and RD are shown in the Appendix. 
3 Consider two extreme situations regarding the distributions of interest and non-interest revenues of two banks in a country. In the first 
situation, one bank is fully concentrated on interest incomes while the other one is concentrated on non-interest incomes. In the second situation, 
the distribution of revenues of these two banks is perfectly balanced between interest and non-interest revenues. The values of country-level 
diversification would be the same under these two extreme situations according to our specification. Therefore, it is necessary to include the 
bank-level diversification into the regressions to distinguish these two situations.  
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findings are consistent and less subject to the endogeneity problem. According to the results of 
the fixed effects estimation, the significant positive coefficients of country-level diversification 
in columns (1) and (2) indicate that diversification is negatively associated with bank 
idiosyncratic risk.4  This finding could be explained by the modern portfolio theory given that 
a firm’s idiosyncratic risk can be reduced by holding a well-diversified portfolio (Markowitz, 
1952; Sharpe, 1964). In contrast, we find significant negative coefficients of CRD in the 
dimension of system risk in columns (3) and (4).5 These findings provide empirical evidence 
in line with the theory of Wagner (2010) according to which diversification makes systemic 
crisis more likely since diversification tends to increase the similarity across banks in terms of 
activities or portfolios as they become more exposed to common risks. These results suggest 
that the degree of diversification in a country may lead to different effects on bank idiosyncratic 
and systemic risk. 
We further run IV-2SLS regressions to check the consistence of our results. We use the 
Diversification Index as an instrument for CRD. The Diversification Index is a variable 
constructed based on two survey questions from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey,6 
and this index shows whether there are any regulatory rules or supervisory guidelines regarding 
assets diversification and whether banks can make loans abroad. We expect a positive 
association between the Diversification Index and the diversification indicator used in our 
study.7 Based on the second-stage results, we find consistent significantly negative relationship 
between diversification and idiosyncratic risk in columns (5) and (6) and a positive relationship 
in the dimension of systemic risk in columns (7) and (8). 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
4 The value of Z-Score is inverse to idiosyncratic risk.   
5 The value of ΔCoVaR is inverse to systemic risk.   
6 This database can be accessed through the website: https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/BRSS. 
7 The F-statistics of the first-stage results of the 2SLS regressions reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of instrumental variables are zero, 
which indicates the relevance of our instruments with respect to the endogenous variable. Detailed results are available upon request. 
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4 Robustness check 
To test whether our results hold for different specifications of the diversification indicator, we 
construct an alternative county-level diversification measure, country-level income diversity 
(CID). Following Laeven and Levine (2007), we first construct the bank-level income diversity 
(ID) for each bank, and then we build up this indicator at the country level to capture the overall 
degree of diversification in a country. We find consistent results in Table 2 with our baseline 
results showing that the overall degree of income diversity in a country has significant negative 
impact on bank systemic stability (columns 3, 4, 7 and 8) and positive impact on individual 
bank stability (columns 1, 2, 5 and 6). 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
5 Conclusion 
This paper provides empirical support to test theoretical arguments indicating a negative impact 
of diversification on bank systemic stability, and further examines whether this effect is 
different for idiosyncratic risk. Our results confirm previous theoretical claims that an increase 
in diversification leads to more systemic risk contributions of banks, which is possibly due to 
higher similarities of activities and portfolios among banks as diversification grows. Our results 
also confirm that diversification reduces bank idiosyncratic risk. 
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Appendix 
A. Calculation of country-level diversification measure 
The bank-level diversification (RD) and the country-level diversification (CRD) are computed 
as follows: 






















where subscripts i, j and t denote bank i, country j and year t. 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is interest income and 
𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is non-interest income. 𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is total operating income, 𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡. A 
high value of country-level revenue diversification (CRD) indicates a high degree of 
diversification between interest and non-interest activities. 
B. Calculation of alternative country-level diversification measure 
𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑗,𝑡 = 1 − |
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 − ∑ 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡




Table 1. The relationship between diversification and bank stability 
Notes: This table reports regression results of the fixed effect estimation in columns (1)-(4) and the IV-2SLS by employing the Diversification Index as the instrument for CRD in columns (5)-(8). Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and clustered at the bank level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variables Z-Score Z-Score ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR Z-Score Z-Score ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
 




         
CRD 3.673*** 3.360*** -0.00980*** -0.000610** 47.62*** 15.10* -1.104*** -0.0161** 
 (0.808) (0.687) (0.00279) (0.000265) (6.946) (8.714) (0.0817) (0.00770) 
RD -3.808*** -5.483*** 0.0220*** -0.000314 -12.26*** -6.914*** 0.244*** 0.00244 
 (0.827) (0.819) (0.00549) (0.000546) (1.647) (1.736) (0.0223) (0.00153) 
Bank Size -0.611** -1.908*** 0.0249*** -6.96e-05 -0.536*** -1.859*** 0.0250*** -8.71e-05 
 (0.259) (0.301) (0.00125) (0.000133) (0.153) (0.171) (0.00200) (0.000164) 
Capitalization 0.576 0.766 -0.00456 -1.25e-05 0.399 0.645* 0.00821 0.000126 
 (0.680) (0.640) (0.00566) (0.000129) (0.339) (0.345) (0.0111) (0.000151) 
NPL -3.759* -7.435*** 0.0351** 0.000647 -10.61*** -10.97*** 0.220*** 0.00273* 
 (2.111) (1.998) (0.0155) (0.000902) (1.917) (1.960) (0.0245) (0.00163) 
Loangrowth -0.302 -0.0314 -0.00321** 9.84e-05 -0.423* -0.147 0.00234 8.66e-06 
 (0.217) (0.216) (0.00134) (0.000196) (0.237) (0.221) (0.00321) (0.000194) 
Loan 0.944 2.209** -0.0326*** -0.000541 0.277 1.848*** -0.00628 2.92e-05 
 (1.016) (1.064) (0.00595) (0.000426) (0.718) (0.692) (0.00914) (0.000523) 
Deposit -8.016*** -11.99*** 0.0438*** 0.000540 -9.430*** -12.17*** 0.0911*** 0.000752 
 (1.410) (1.405) (0.00851) (0.000474) (0.881) (0.806) (0.0120) (0.000578) 
GDPgrowth 13.71*** 14.31*** 0.164*** 0.00529** 38.59*** 14.83*** -0.302*** 0.0110*** 
 (2.528) (4.015) (0.0126) (0.00215) (4.542) (4.265) (0.0597) (0.00415) 
GDPpercap 7.673*** 1.029 0.104*** 5.29e-05 10.03*** -0.766 -0.0117 -0.00171 
 (1.011) (1.249) (0.0102) (0.000498) (0.914) (1.067) (0.0125) (0.00107) 
Inflation -0.949 -1.296 0.0804*** 0.00378*** 4.130* -1.825 -0.166*** 0.00563*** 
 (1.790) (1.619) (0.0157) (0.00138) (2.408) (1.464) (0.0455) (0.00184) 
Constant -39.19*** 49.86*** -1.501*** -0.117***     
 (8.267) (11.65) (0.0929) (0.00460)     
         
Number of Observations 16,901 16,901 16,018 16,018 15,219 15,219 14,473 14,473 
Number of Banks 1,346 1,346 1,342 1,342 1,317 1,317 1,317 1,317 
R-squared 0.040 0.079 0.342 0.993 -0.376 0.047 -6.102 0.990 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effect NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic     245.95*** 39.42*** 210.48*** 38.50*** 
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Table 2. Robustness check: The relationship between income diversity and bank stability 
Notes: This table reports regression results of the fixed effect estimation in columns (1)-(4) and the IV-2SLS by employing the Diversification 
Index as the instrument for CID in columns (5)-(8). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and 




























Dependent Variables Z-Score Z-Score ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR Z-Score Z-Score ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Fixed effect estimation IV-2SLS 






28.04*** 6.858* -0.633*** -0.00688** 
 (0.255) (0.202) (0.000792) (6.68e-05) (4.054) (3.759) (0.0533) (0.00334) 
ID -2.648*** -3.778*** 0.0124*** -0.000158 -8.277*** -4.637*** 0.147*** 0.00111 
 (0.406) (0.411) (0.00280) (0.000288) (1.057) (0.814) (0.0170) (0.000738) 
         
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 16,901 16,901 16,018 16,018 15,219 15,219 14,473 14,473 
Number of Banks 1,346 1,346 1,342 1,342 1,317 1,317 1,317 1,317 
R-squared 0.042 0.084 0.342 0.993 -1.496 0.007 -20.272 0.989 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effect NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald 
rk F-statistic 
    181.64*** 35.02*** 156.79*** 34.92*** 
